Although not its focal concern, it is noteworthy that the specificity of the aesthetic is a recurring theme in Habermas's work. While the question ofthe possibility, or even the necessity, ofa communicative theory ofaesthetic experience is left unanswered both by the "transformation ofphilosophy" (Apel) and by critical theory's linguistic turn, Habermas describes the specificity ofthe aesthetic and of artistic phenomena in tern1S of two closely related dimensions: the historical-sociological and the philosophical. The former concerns the relations between art, culture, and society as analyzed in the context oflate capitalism and the project ofmodernity while the latter treats the specificity ofthe aesthetic by means ofthe pragmatics oflanguage. Both dimensions converge in the systematic horizon ofThe Theory ofCommunicative Action, yet are already touched upon in The Structural Transformation ofthe Public Sphere as weH as in essays on Bloch, Adorno, and historical materialism, aH dating from the 1960s.
In approximating the failure ofmodernity and the rehabilitation ofconservatism, he seeks a connection between these two phenomena which correspond with the disqualification of the project of the Enlightenment. On the one hand, Haberrnas sketches an aesthetics which up to now was missing in his work; on the other hand, this aesthetics directly intervenes on the 'political and intellectual debate,' that is, on the sociological analysis and in the political project.
If an aesthetics is indeed sketched out in this text, its first traces are found in a work that Habermas published in the following year: The Theory ofCommunicative Action (hereafter TCA).
I begin by discussing the place ofaesthetics within TCA, and proceed to examine Habem1as' s reply to a criticismby Albrecht Wellmer regarding the fonner' s attempt to detennine the specificity of the aesthetic. This examination will highlight what I see as Habermas' s (and Wellmer's) principal contribution to a communicative theory ofaesthetic experience. Finally, I shall indicate some ofthattheory's more important tasks.
TCA offers a normative foundation for the critical theory of society. In its last chapter, Habermas addresses the philosophical tasks ofa theory ofmodemity. Unlike Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, whose critique ofideology seeks to comprehend the "nonnative content ofbourgeois culture, ofart, and philosophical thought,"S and to lay the foundations ofa critical theory ofsociety founded on an emphatic conception ofreason, Habennas reforrnulates the program ofa critical theory ofsociety and the nonnative bases ofcommunicative reason. This new normative foundation not only still demands a philosophy, but also places before it "systematic tasks": "The social sciences can enter into a cooperative relation with a philosophy that has taken up the task ofworking on a theory ofrationality" (TCA 2, 397).
The theory of rationality does not offer a philosophical foundation to cultural modernity in axiological spheres and autonomous complexes of knowledge and practices.
These magnificent 'one-sidednesses,' which are the signature ofmodemity, need DO foundation and no justification in the sense of a transcendental grounding, but they do call for a self-understanding regarding the character ofthis knowlwdge. Two questions must be answered: (i) whether a reason that has objectively split up into its moments can still preserve its unity, and (ii) how expert cultures can be mediated with everydaypractice (TCA 2,397-8).
Habermas is reminded that the first chapter of TCA 1, on the "problem ofrationality," as weIl as its first "intermediate reflection," represent a provisional attempt to address these questions. This attempt puts in question the philosophical basis of a critical theory of society founded on communicative reason.
With that as a basis, the theory of science, the theory of law and morality, and aesthetics, in cooperation with the corresponding historical disciplines, canthenreconstruct both the emergence and the internal history ofthose modem complexes oflmowledge that have been differentiated out, each under a different single aspect of validity-truth, nonnative rightness, or authenticity. The mediation ofthe moments ofreason is no less a problem than the separation ofthe aspects ofrationality under which questions oftruth, justice, and taste were differentiated from one another. The onlyprotection against an empirieist abridgement ofthe rationalityproblematic is a steadfastpursuit ofthe tortuous routes along which science, morality, and art communicate with one another (TCA 2, 398).
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Itis herethattheproblemofthe specificityofthe aesthetic reappears, nowprojected against the theoretical background to which the systematic position of aesthetics in the architectonics ofcommunicative reason pays special attention. All thinking around the specificity of the aesthetic now occurs within the context of a philosophy that is no longer metaphysical, as indicated at the outset of TCA l:
In contemporaryphilosophy, wherever coherent argumentation has developed around constant thematic cores-in logic and the theory of science, in the theory of language and meaning, in ethics and action theory, even in aesthetics-interest is directed to the formal conditions ofrationality in lmowing, in reaching understanding through language, and in acting, both in everyday contexts and at the level ofmethodically organized experience or systematically organized discourse. The theory ofargumentation thereby takes on a special significance; to it falls the task of reconstructing the formal-pragmatic presuppositions and conditions ofan explicitly rational behavior (TCA l, 2).
The role played by the theory ofargumentation corresponds to modernity' s internal differentiation ofthe concept ofreason. Replacing a metaphysical conception ofreason is a fonnal conception whose unity is expressed inprocesses by which claims to validity are justified for theoretical, moral, and aesthetic judgments. The philosophical disciplines are therefore oriented toward a reconstructive work, applying themselves to fonnal pragmatic analysis, which focuses on the general and necessary conditions for the validity of sYlnbolic expressions and achieven1ents. I am referring to rational reconstructions ofthe lmow-how ofsubjects who are capable of speech and action, who are credited which the capacity to produce valid utterances, and who consider themselves capable of distinguishing, at least intuitively, between valid and invalid expressions. This is the domain of disciplines like logic and metamathematics, epistemology and the philosophy ofscience, linguistics and the philosophy oflanguage, ethics and action theory, aesthetics, argumentation theory, and so on. Cornmon to all these disciplines is the goal ofproviding an account ofthe pretheoretical knowledge and the intuitive command ofruJe systems that underlie the production and evaluation of such symbolic expressions and achievements.... legislative authority they acquire a critical function as weIl. Insofar as they extend the differentiations between individual claims to validity beyond traditional boundaries, they can even establish new analytic standards and thus assume a constructive role. And insofar as we succed in analyzing very general conditions ofvalidity, rational reconstructions can clainlto be describing universals and thus to represent a theoreticalknowledge capable ofcompeting with other such knowledge. At this level, weak transcendental arguments make their appearance, arguments aimed at demonstrating that the pressupositions ofrelevant practices are inescapable, that is, that they cannot be cast aside. Habennas' s effort to determine the specificity of the aesthetic by means of the pragmatics oflanguage is criticized by Wellmer, for whom aesthetic judgnlents do not conformto any ofthe three classes ofillocutionary acts,just as works ofart cannot be understood by analogy to any kind ofspeech act with its respective validity claim. These arguments were first developed in the context of an attempt to establish a pragmatic-linguistic refonnulation ofthe concept of"artistic truth" in Adorno. Habennas thoroughly accepts Wellmer's criticism, and makes use ofit in his response to a work that was the first dedicated to a broad exposition and con1D1entary on his aesthetic ideas: Martin Jay's "Habermas and Modemism."s Habermas identifies what allows us to refer to an aesthetic-practical rationality:
There is an unmistakable indicatorforthe factthat a certain type of'knowing' is objectified in art works, albeit in a different way than in theoretical discourse or in legal or moral representations: these objectivations ofmind are also fallible and hence criticizable. Art criticismarose at the same time as the autonomous work of art; and since then the insight has established itselfthat the work of art calls for interpretation, evaluation and even 'linguistification' (Versprachlichung) ofits semantic content. Art criticism hasdeveloped forms of argumentation that specifically differentiate it from the forms oftheoretical and moral-practical discourse. As distinct frommerely subjective preference, the fact that we link judgments of taste to a criticizable claim presupposes non-arbitrary standards for the judgment of art. 9 Habermas assimilates Wellmer's criticism as follows:
As the philosophical discussion of'artistic truth' reveals, works of art raise claims with regard to their unity (harmony: Stimmigkeit), their authenticity, and the success of their expressions by which they can be measured and in terms of which they may fai!. For that reason I believe that a pragmatic logic of argumentation is the most appropriate guiding thread through which the 'aesthetic-practical' type ofrationality can be differentiated over and against others types ofrationality (QC, 200).
Habermas remarks that Wellmer formulates this argument "in such an ingenious way" that it suffices "to refer to his treatment" (QC, 203). Accepting Wellmer' s 0 bj ection, Habermas alters his notion of"aesthetic criticism" toward one that allows the recognition ofworks ofart as bearers ofa specijic validity claim, which could admit the legitimacy of the term (aesthetic) discourse, til then restricted to the theoretical and practical spheres.
The fact that we can dispute the reasons for evaluating a work ofart in aesthetic discourse is, as we said, an unmistakable indication for a validity claim inherent in works of arte The aesthetic 'validity' or 'unity' that we attribute to a work refers to its singularly illuminating power to open our eyes to what is seemingly familiar, to disclose anew an apparently familiar reality. This validity claim admittedly stands for a potential for 'truth' that can be released only in the whole complexity oflife-experience; therefore this 'truth potential' may not be conected to (or even indentified with) just one ofthe three validity claims constitutive for communicative action, as I have been previously inclined to maintain.The ono-to-one relationship which exists between the prescriptive validity ofa norm and the normative validity claims raised in regulative speech acts is not a proper model for the relation between the potential for truth of works ofart, and the transformed relations between selfand world stimulated by aesthetic experience (QC, 203).
Similarly, in The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity (hereafter PDM), Habennas points out that "communicative reason fmds its criteria in the argumentative procedures for directly or indirectly redeeming claims to propositional truth, normative rightness, subjective truthfulness, and aesthetic harmony" (PDM, 314), and adds in a note: "Albrecht W ellmer has sho'WIl that the harmony of a work of art-aesthetic truth, as it is called-can by no means be reduced, without further ado, to authenticity or sincerity" (PDM, 418 n. 18). Habermas reiterates how Welhner's and Seel's arguments led hirn to "correct" the "reductions of an expressivist aesthetic at least suggested by the Theory ofCommunicative Action."lo Such statements reveal the ambiguities and difficulties ofHabermas'sattempts to determine the specificity of the aesthetic in both its normative and expressive dimensions. Habermas suggests an "expressivist aesthetic" in TCA while tending to understand the validity both of aesthetic judgements and of the play between authenticity of expression and normative adequation:
Questions oftaste introduce new complications having to do with the relation of evaluations to normative sentences on the one side, and to expressive sentences, on the other. The adequacy of standards ofvalue has something in common with the rightness of norms of action; on the other hand, the authenticity ofworks of art, in connection with which standards ofvalue are formed and authenticated, has more in common with the sincerity of expressions. 11 If TCA suggests an aesthetics it is a "nonnative-expressivist" aesthetics insofar as the aesthetic sphere is described as a field of experience in which normative and expressive elements intertwine. In a way, Wellmer simplifies Haberrnas'sarguments. That Habennas came to modify his arguments as set forth in TCA can be seen from some passages in PDM. This reformulation is subtly connected to what Habermas describes as the "specific contribution" ofexemplary works ofart, since the possibility offreeing the semantic potential so as to make this intersubjectively available depends on the capacity oflanguage to open the worldfor uso
Habermas's contributions to aesthetics are both historical and methodological.
In the preface to PDM, Habermas observes that modemity's elevation to the status of a philosophical category dates from the late eighteenth century, and that the philosophical and aesthetic discourses ofmodemity frequently coincide. He remarks, however, that it was necessary to limit the scope ofhis investigation to exclude the question of"modemism in art and literature," to which Peter Bürger, H. R. JauB, and Wellmer have contributed substantially.12 That Habermas thus limits his work is an indication not ofcomplete withdrawal from aesthetics, as Claude Piche believes, 13 but ofits remaining a persisting question still to be dealt with. While PDM does not include a systematic elaboration ofthe questions ofaesthetic theory, its contribution to the question of the specificity of the aesthetic ought not to be dismissed, being fOWld instead at a different level: that ofthe history ofthe aesthetic critique ofmodernity which develops from Schillerto Marcuse, and that includes the young Hegel, Schelling and Höderlin, Schlegel and the flISt Romanticism, Nietzsche and Adomo, to mention some ofthe main authors to whon1 Habermas refers. Haberrnas' s main methodological contribution to the foundations of aesthetics consists in the introduction of the pragmatic logic of argumentation as "the most appropriate guiding tbread through which the 'aesthetic-practical' type ofrationality can be differentiated over and against others types ofrationality." On this question, Wellmer and Seel have offered a more rigorous fonnulation, arguing against Habermas that the specificity ofdiscourses is not determined by a specific type ofvalidity claim. Theoretical, practical, and aesthetic discourses can so permeate each other that distinguishing among different validity claims and their validation modes can be highly problematic. The need to compare and relate different standards of rationality calls for communicative reasonto act as a "faculty ofinter-rationaljudgment," or the capacity to carry out the necessary mediations and transitions among the different dimensions ofrationality in the search for adequate solutions to theoretical, practical, and aesthetic problems. 14 Aesthetic discourse, says Wellmer, "is concemed neither with the validity of statements nor with the correctness of actions, but with the meaning of aesthetic objects and whether they are successful ornot, i.e. with the (aesthetic) 'validity-claims' ofthese objects.,,15 This is the central point in Wellmer's critique ofwhat he takes to be the one-sided, subjective-expressivist nature ofHabermas' s concept ofaesthetic validity. Wellmer breaks with this subjective-expressivist impulse insofar as he disengages the concept of "validity claim" from its original scope (the analysis of speech acts), and takes aesthetic objects themselves as bearers of specific validity claims:
Habennas and the Specificity of the Aesthetic As with theoretical and practical discourse, interpretations, empirical assertions, and claims to moral correctness are interlinked in aesthetic discourse, just as expressive validity-claims are. What is grounded through aesthetic discourse are aesthetic value-judgements; but these point beyond themselves to the validity-claim ofthe aesthetic objects on which the judgments are made, and that is something which can only be redeemed in aesthetic experience.
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I shall not address the problem ofthe specificity ofaesthetic discourse as it relates to art works' s specific validity claims, which would n10re fittingly be treated in connection with Seel's arguments against Habermas, and instead focus on Wellmer's conclusion regarding the multiple possible constellations formed by discourses, for it is on these grounds that he rejects Habermas's model ofuniversal pragmatics as one-sided and schematic.
Theoretical, practical, and aesthetic discourse are interrelated in many ways, but each is concemed with something different. Theoretical discourse aims at valid statements, explanations and interpretations; practical discourse at correct actions, attitudes and decisions; aesthetic discourse at appropriate ways of perceiving aesthetic objects. But within each ofthese forms of discourse too, the various fonns ofargwnent are always-potentially at least-interlinked in many ways, because the sense ofparticular arguments is derived from the presence ofperspectives and premises which can make it necessary in a case of doubt for the discussion to move to a different form of argument. But precisely these intemallinks between different forms of argument are not capable ofexplanation bymeans ofa typologyofvalidity-clairns (propositional truth, moral correctness, truthfulness) grounded in universal pragmatics. To put it another way, distinctions based on speech-act theory are not in themselves sufficient to render understandable either the difference between 'spheres of validity' or the internal connection between them. 17
Wellmer's conclusion seems too influenced by Seel's criticism ofHabennas. EIsewhere, Wellmer proceeds more moderately when analyzing concrete problems and takes up an intermediary position between Seel and Habermas. Wellmer's interesting conclusion regarding the play ofdiscourses pertains more to the dynamics ofa somewhat schematic typology ofspeech acts than to a straightforward abandonment ofthe basic intuitions ofuniversal pragmatics, ofwhich Seel is more skeptical. Wellmer's criticism of discourse ethics and the theory oftruth (and of validity in general) as consensus as weIl as bis attempt to reformwate inpragmatic-linguistic tenns the concept of"artistic truth" in Adomo are examples of such moderation.
In reply to a work by Rainer Rochlitz, 18 Habermas justifies his parsimony when addressing the problems ofthe arts and aesthetic theory: "my late fragmentary address to aesthetic questions," he writes, was due to "the feeling that I have not yet awoke to the complexity ofsuch questions.,,19 Despite having written on some ofthe most irnportant aesthetic questions in the works ofAdomo, Marcuse, and Benjamin, about the critique ofart as one ofthe "institutions ofthe public sphere," and about the meaning of modem art as pertaining to late capitalism's "motivational crises," despite his positions on the modem and postmodern architecture debate, his analysis of the neoconservative critique ofculture and art in the United States and Germany, or the problem of distinguishing philosophical and literary genres, Habermas does not formulate an aesthetic program, nor are bis contributions to aesthetics comparable to those he offers to the philosophy of science and to ethics, despite what lengthy passages on the specificity ofthe aesthetic in TCA and PDMmay suggest. It is possible, however, to indicate at the very least some ofthe central tasks ofthe theory ofaesthetics.
These include, frrst, a reconstruction of the genesis and internal history of the aesthetic sphere as an axiological sphere and a complex oflmowledge in the larger context ofthe dissolution oftraditional worldviews and the specification ofscience, morality, and arte Haberrnas's point is that such autonomous developments, characteristic of cultural modernity, are not linear developments but learning processes inherent to the internaI history ofscience, morality, and arte They also include a reconstruction of the formal conditions of aesthetic rationality and the mode of argun1entation appropriate to it. Aesthetic theory must give an account ofits relations with specialized aesthetic criticism and with the reception ofparticular art works. In both cases the problem of the double necessity of mediation between cultural spheres made autonomous and between the set ofthese spheres and everyday communicative practice reappears under the demand of a reflection about the nature of the contribution of an aesthetic theory to the project ofmodernity. The nature ofthis contribution could be elucidated through the analysis ofthe·potential ofthe moral, etbical, and existential dimensions ofaesthetic experience. These dimensions constitute what Jauß has called "catharsis"-the communicative function ofaesthetic experience understood as its founding potential and in its role of granting legitimacy to action norms. What is at stake here is the nexus between aesthetics and the entire spectrumofpractical reason. In his discussion ofaesthetic experience, Jauß establishes this nexus by way ofKant and against Adorno and Habermas, with whom, however, he shares the same support ofthe Aufklärung.20 I believe, however, that Jauß's argument can be formulated only in shifting to a communicative theory ofaesthetic experience. One fmal task ofaesthetic theory is the reconstruction of the ontogenesis and the development of aesthetic competence as the faculty ofjudgment analogous to theoretical and moral competence.
These three tasks converge on the problem ofthe unity ofreason as weIl as on the status of aesthetics as a reconstructive theory. While I shall not resolve these problems here, I would like to conclude by examining a possible objection against the frrst and last identified tasks.
Habennas admits Wellmer'sand Seel's criticismto have led him to the "correction" ofthe "reductions ofan expressivist aesthetic," as suggested in TCA. Yet, as is stated in PDM, it is in opposing Derrida's thesis ofphilosophy as literature that Habermas considers the problem ofthe specificity ofthe aesthetic underthe aspect ofthe linguisticpoetic function of world-disclosure. However, this text appears to contain a contradiction. Its first paragraph sees Habermas referring to the autonomy of art as a learning process, consistently with what he had stated about the project ofmodernity in TCA and in answer to Martin Jay's and Thomas McCarthy's objections. After discussing Max Weber's point about the specificity of western rationalism and highlighting the nexus between the deconstruction of religious worldviews and the establishment of a profane culture, Habermas w-rites: "With the modern enlpirical sciences, autonomous arts, and theories ofmorality and law grounded on principles, cultural spheres ofvalue took shape which made possible leaming processes in accord with the respective inner logic oftheoretical, aesthetic, and moral-practical problems" (PDM, 1). This argument is later restated, but in altered fonn. Habermas no longer refers to leaming processes at the level of art made autonomous, nor to aesthetic problems. He rehes no longer on Piaget's view, but on Austin's and Searle's arguments about the differences between the normal and derivative uses of language. Based on these arguments, and on Jakobson' s linguistics, Habermas states that the literary use of language is that in which the poetic function predominates over language's other functions. The latter-the constative, regulative, and expressive functions-are analyzed within a pragnlatic-linguistic reformulation ofBühler's semiotic model. According to this perspective, Habermas asserts that the specific function performed by art, now an autonomous sphere, is that of world-disclosure:
[I]n communicative action the creative moment ofthe linguistic constitution of the world forms one syndrome with the cognitive-instrumental, moralpractical, and expressive moments ofthe intramundane linguistic functions of representation, interpersonal relation, and subjective expression. In the nl0dem world, 'value spheres' have been differentiated out from each ofthese moments-namely, on the one hand, art, literature, and a criticism specialized in questions of taste, around the axis of world-disclosure; and, on the other hand, problem-solving discourses specialized in questions oftruth andjustice, aroWld the axis ofintramundane learningprocesses. These knowledge systems ofart and criticism, science and philosophy, law and morality, have become the more split offfrom ordinary communication the more strictly and onesidedly they each have to do with one linguistic function and one aspect of validity.... From the viewpoint of individual cultural spheres of value, the syndrome ofthe everyday world appears as 'life' or as 'practice' or as 'ethos,' over against which stands 'art' or 'theory' or 'morality'" (PDM, 339-40).
This characterization of cultural modemity is not only an expression of the skepticismthat, in his answer to Jay and McCarthy, Haberrnas voiced regarding Piaget's genetic psychology in the analysis ofwhat he even then understood to be a process ofartistic leaming, and the level ofleaming achieved by aesthetic modernity. Although Habermas does not clearly state why he no longer treats artistic development as a leaming process, his tendency to see this development as belonging to the linguistic function ofworld-disclosure appears to be an answer to that skepticism With McCarthy, Habermas speaks ofaesthetic leaming as "the progressive constitution ofa particular donlain ofautonomous art and aesthetic experience purified of cognitive and moral admixtures," and the "expanding explorations that illurninate more and more ofthis realm of experience" (QC, 207). Further:
Habermas and the Speeifieity of the Aesthetie Art beeomes a laboratory, the eritie an expert, the development of art the medium of a learning proeess-here, naturally, not in the sense of an aeeumulation of epistemie contents, of an aesthetie 'progress'-whieh is possible only in individual dimensions-but nonetheless in the sense of a eoneentrieally expanding, advaneing exploration of arealm ofpossibilities structurally opened up with the autonomization of art (QC, 207).
While skeptieal ofusing genetie psyehology to eharaeterize such learning, a proeess ofaesthetie learning remains and does not eontradiet the newer analysis ofautonomous artistic development. The realm of possibilities opened up by the elevation of art to a position ofautonomy, arealm where subj ectivity is made sovereign onee freed from theoretieal and moral eonstraints, is the domain in whieh the linguistie funetion of world-diselosure reigns, predominating over other funetions and exerting its strueturing power.
Habennas's arguments, then, do not invalidate what I indieated to be the fundamental tasks of a eommunicative theory of aesthetie experienee. His skeptieism, however, must be re-thought in light ofan interesting suggestion by Wellmer. At the eonelusion to his essay, "Adorno, Advoeate ofthe Non-Identieal," Wellmer refers to the "'posteonventional' charaeter ofmodem art."21 This eharaeterization aecords with what Adorno ealled the "nominalism," the "eonstruetive prineiple," or the "opened form" of modem arte 1ts post-eonventional eharaeter would thus be in its "emaneipation from tradition's signifieation, stylistie and fonnal schemes" (DMP, 162), or, in Adomo's words, in its "struggle for majority (Mündigkeit)." The "opened forms" ofmodem artprojeet a new image ofthe subjeet, insofar as they break with the "harmonie unity ofthe bourgeois art work and the repressive unit ofthe bourgeois subjeet.... The opened forms ofmodem art are, aeeording to Adomo, an answer to the aesthetie eonseienee emaneipated from the apparent and violent charaeter of such traditional totalities of meaning" (DMP, 163). To this "emaneipated aesthetie conseiousness," to this "autonomous aesthetic subjeetivity that struggles to organise the work ofart in freedom and from out itself' (Adorno), eorresponds the image ofa subjeet emaneipated from the eonditions ofbourgeois subjeetivity-a subjeet whose individuality and identity have beeome fluid (DMP, 163). I believe this emaneipation ofaesthetie eonsciousness by modem art, this aesthetie Aufklärung, ean be analyzed as a leaming proeess, not unlike the developn1ental stages ofmoral eonseiousness and aesthetie eompetenee. Wellmer refers to the post-eonventional eharaeter of modem art, suggesting an evolutionary line in whieh bourgeois art figures as a dominantly eonventional (traditional) arte A reeonstruetion ofthe genesis and internal history ofthe aesthetie sphere as an autonomous value sphere and eomplex ofknowledge, undertaken in the scope ofthe evolution ofworldviews, must not exelude this hypothesis.
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